Abstract We improve the flexibility in designing access structures of quantum stabilizer-based secret sharing schemes for classical secrets, by introducing message randomization in their encoding procedures. We generalize the Gilbert-Varshamov bound for deterministic encoding to randomized encoding of classical secrets. We also provide an explicit example of a ramp secret sharing scheme with which one symbol in its classical secret is revealed to an intermediate set, and justify the necessity of incorporating strong security criterion of conventional secret sharing. Finally, we propose an explicit construction of strongly secure ramp secret sharing by quantum stabilizers.
Both secret and shares are traditionally classical information. There exists a close connection between secret sharing and classical error-correcting codes [3, 8, 10, 11, 23, 25, 31] .
After the importance of quantum information became well-recognized, secret sharing schemes with quantum shares were proposed [9, 14, 17, 19, 37] . A connection between quantum secret sharing and quantum error-correcting codes has been well-known for many years [9, 14, 37] . Well-known classes of quantum error-correcting codes are the CSS codes [7, 38] , the stabilizer codes [5, 6, 13] and their nonbinary generalizations [2, 20, 29] .
The access structure of a secret sharing scheme is the set of qualified sets, that of intermediate sets and that of forbidden sets. When both secret and shares are classical information, encoding of secrets to shares are almost always randomized, that is, for a fixed secret, shares are randomly chosen from a set determined by the secret [35, 39] . By message randomization we mean this kind of randomized encoding of secrets to shares. Gottesman [14, Theorem 3] proved that message randomization does not offer any advantage when both secret and shares are quantum information, and that use of unitary encoding of quantum secret to quantum shares is sufficient. Probably because of Gottesman's observation, secret sharing schemes based on quantum error-correcting codes have not used message randomization, as far as this author knows.
In our previous research [26, 27] , we expressed secret sharing for classical secrets based on quantum stabilizer codes by linear codes, and expressed qualified and forbidden sets in terms of the linear codes associated with quantum stabilizers. By using that, we gave a Gilbert-Varshamov-type existence condition of secret sharing schemes with given parameters, and proved that there exist infinitely many access structures that can be realized by quantum stabilizer codes but cannot be realized by any classical information processing.
However, there is some drawback in our proposal [26, 27] . For example, any − 1 participants out of participants can be made forbidden, for example, by Shamir's scheme. But such an access structure cannot be realized by [26, 27] . The first goal of this paper is to make the stabilizer-based secret sharing more flexible in designing access structures by introducing message randomization in the encoding. In our previous proposal [26, 27] , shares are deterministic functions of secrets. The proposed scheme in this paper includes [26, 27] as a special case.
Ordinary ramp schemes have the following security risk: Suppose that classical secret is = ( 1 , . . . , ), and an intermediate set has (≥ 1) symbol of information about . Then that intermediate set sometimes knows explicitly for some . This insecurity was mentioned in [31, 40] . Iwamoto and Yamamoto [18] explicitly constructed such an example with classical secret and classical shares, and Zhang and Matsumoto [41] did with quantum shares. In order to address this security risk, Yamamoto [40] introduced the notion of strong security into ramp schemes: A secret sharing scheme with classical secret = ( 1 , . . . , ) is said to be strongly secure if any ( − ) symbols in is always statistically independent of shares in an intermediate set that has symbol of information about , for = 1, . . . , − 1. The second goal of this paper is to give an explicit construction of ramp secret sharing with message randomization for classical secrets based on quantum stabilizer codes, by extending the previous construction [26, 27] .
Strong security concerns with secrecy of parts of a message. The secrecy of parts of a message has also been studied for network coding [15, 22, 28, 36] and wiretap channel coding [16, 21] .
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces necessary notations and proposes randomized encoding for quantum stabilizer-based secret sharing. Section 3 clarifies the access structure of the proposed scheme. Section 4 analyses the amount of information leaked to an intermediate set, which will be used for the strong security later. Section 5 generalize the Gilbert-Varshamov existential condition for secret sharing schemes from one given in [26, 27] . Section 6 introduces a strong security criterion and an explicit construction with strong security based on Reed-Solomon codes. Then we compare the proposed construction with the McEliece-Sarwate strongly secure ramp secret sharing scheme [31] .
Randomized encoding and its access structures

Preliminaries
Let ⊂ {1, . . . , } be a set of shares (or equivalently participants), = {1, . . . , } ⧵ , and Tr the partial trace over . For a density matrix , col( ) denotes its column space. When col ( 1 ), . . . , col( ) are orthogonal to each other, that is, = 0 for ≠ , we can distinguish 1 , . . . , by a suitable projective measurement with probability 1. Since density matrices are quantum generalization of probability distributions [32] , the result of randomized encoding of a secret can be expressed as a density matrix.
Definition 1 [26, 27] Let ( ) be the density matrix of shares in encoded from a classical secret . We say to be qualified if col( ( ))) and col( ( ′ )) are orthogonal to each other for different classical secrets , ′ . We say to be forbidden if ( ) is the same density matrix regardless of classical secret . By an access structure we mean the set of qualified sets and the set of forbidden sets.
Let be a prime number, the finite field with elements, and the -dimensional complex linear space. The quantum state space of qudits is denoted by ⊗ with its orthonormal basis {| ⟩ ∶ ∈ }. For two vectors , ∈ , denote by ⟨ , ⟩ the standard Euclidean inner product. For two vectors ( | ) and ( ′ | ′ ) ∈ 2 , we define the standard symplectic inner product
For an -linear space S ⊂ 2 , ⟂ S denotes its orthogonal space in 2 with respect to ⟨⋅, ⋅⟩ . Throughout this paper we always assume dim S = − − and S ⊆ ⟂ S . We will use to denote the number of symbols in classical secrets and (≥ 0) to denote amount of randomness in encoding. We also assume that we have R ⊇ S and dim R = − .
For ( | ) ∈ 2 , define the × complex unitary matrix ( ) ( ) as defined in [20] . An [[ , + ]] quantum stabilizer codes encoding qudits into qudits can be defined as a simultaneous eigenspace of all ( ) ( ) (( | ) ∈ R ). Unlike [20] we do not require the eigenvalue of to be one.
Proposed randomized encoding
It is well-known in mathematics [1, Chapter 7] ∕ max we will write | ⟩ to mean ( ) ( )| ⟩ (( | ) ∈ ). For a given classical secret ∈ , we consider the following secret sharing scheme with participants:
and ( ) can also seen as a subset of
∕ max at uniformly random. Prepare the quantum codeword | ⟩ ∈ that corresponds to the classical secret . 2. Distribute each qudit in the quantum codeword | ⟩ to a participant.
Since there are choices of above, the density matrix of shares is
Remark 2
The encoding procedure in [26, 27] corresponds to the special case R = max = ⟂ R and = 0 in the above proposed scheme. By using them, we define S = { }, R as the linear space spanned by {( 1 | ), ( | 1 )}, and max as the linear space spanned by
and we can use
, the proposed encoder chooses a vector at uniformly random from the set
6 , for fixed ( 1 , 2 ) the number of possible choices is 3 6 . But since | ⟩ is an eigenvector of all unitary matrices corresponding to a vector in max , for fixed ( 1 , 2 ) the number of possible quantum states is | ⟂ R ∕ max | = 3 2 . The encoded shares ( ) ( )| ⟩ consist of 4 qudit in 3 . Each quantum share in 3 is distributed to each participant.
Necessary and sufficient conditions on qualified and forbidden sets
Let ⊂ {1, . . . , }. Define = {( 1 , . . . , | 1 , . . . , ) ∈ 2 ∶ ( , ) = 0 for ∉ }. Let to be the projection map onto , that is, ( 1 , . . . , | 1 , . . . , ) = ( | ) ∈ .
Theorem 4 For the secret sharing scheme described in Section 2, is qualified if and only if
is forbidden if and only if
Remark 5 The encoding procedure depends on the choice of max = ⟂ max but by Theorem 4 we see that the access structure is independent of that choice.
Proof (Theorem 4) Assume Eq. (1). Then there exists a basis
have the same value of the symplectic inner product against a fixed ( | ), which will be denoted by ⟨( | ), ⟩ . Suppose that we have
, a contradiction. We have seen that any two different cosets have different symplectic inner product values against some ( | ). For each , the participants can collectively perform quantum projective measurement corresponding to the eigenspaces of ( ) ( ) and can determine the symplectic inner product 1 ⟨( | ), ( )⟩ as [20, Lemma 5] when the classical secret is . Since ( | ) has nonzero components only at , the above measurement can be done only by , which means can reconstruct .
Assume that Eq. (1) is false. Since the orthogonal space of S in is isomorphic to ( ⟂ S ), which can be seen as the almost same argument as the duality between shortened linear codes and punctured linear codes [34] , we see that dim (
. This means that there exists two different classical secrets 1 and 2 such that ( ( 1 )) = ( ( 2 )). This means that the encoding procedures of 1 and 2 are the exactly the same on and produce the same density matrix on , which shows that is not qualified.
Assume Eq. (2). Then we have dim (
This means that for all classical secrets , ( ( )) and their encoding procedures on are the same, which produces the same density matrix on regardless of . This shows that is forbidden.
Assume that Eq. (2) is false. Then there exist two different classical secrets 1 , 2 , and Lemma 5] , this means that the quantum measurement corresponding to ( ) ( ) gives different outcomes with Tr ( ( 1 )) and Tr ( ( 2 )). Since ( | ) ∈ , measurement of ( ) ( ) can be performed only by participants in . These observations show that is not forbidden.
⊓ ⊔
Next we give sufficient conditions in terms of the coset distance [11] or the first relative generalized Hamming weight [24] . To do so, we have to slightly modify them. For ( | ) = ( 1 , . . . , | 1 , . . . , ) ∈ , define its symplectic weight swt( ∩ . We also have = ker( ), which means dim ( give different symplectic inner products for some vector ( | ) in R ∩ .
Proof Assume that ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) give the same symplectic inner product for all vectors in R ∩ . Then we have { ( | ) + (
∈ ( 2 )}, and the encoding procedure on is the same for 1 and 2 , which shows Tr ( ( 1 )) = Tr ( ( 2 )).
Assume that ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) give different symplectic inner product values for some vector ( | ) in R ∩ . Then the quantum measurement corresponding to ( ) ( ) can be performed only by the participants in and by [20, Lemma 5 ] the outcomes for ( 1 ) and ( ( 2 )) are different with probability 1. This means that col(Tr ( ( ))) and col(Tr ( ( ))) are orthogonal to each other.
⊓ ⊔
Proposition 9
If dim R ∩ ∕ S ∩ = , then the number of density matrices in = {Tr ( ( )) ∶ ∈ } is . For a fixed density matrix ∈ , the number of classical secrets such that = Tr ( ( )) is exactly − .
Proof
) for ( | ) ∈ ( ) with classical secrets ( = 1, 2), then by Lemma 8 col(Tr ( ( 1 ))) and col(Tr ( ( 2 ))) are orthogonal. By the assumption, we have
There are elements in ( ⟂ )∕ ( max ), which shows the first claim.
The composite -linear map "mod (
) is surjective. Thus the dimension of its kernel is − , which shows the second claim.
Definition 10
In light of Proposition 9, the amount of information possessed by a set of participants is defined as
Remark 11 When the probability distribution of classical secrets is uniform, the quantity in Definition 10 is equal to the Holevo information [32, Section 12.1.1] between and Tr ( ( )) by the same reason as [27, Remark 14] .
We say that a secret sharing scheme is -reconstructible if | | ≥ implies has log 2 or more bits of information [12] . We say that a secret sharing scheme is -private if | | ≤ implies has less than log 2 bits of information [12] . In order to express and in terms of combinatorial properties of , we review a slightly modified version of the relative generalized Hamming weight [24] .
Definition 12 [27] For two linear spaces 2 ⊂ 1 ⊂ 2 and = 1, . . . , , define the -th relative generalized symplectic weight
Note that 1 = . The following theorem generalizes Theorem 6.
Theorem 13
Proof Almost the same as [27, Theorem 16] . ⊓ ⊔
Remark 14
We have assumed the prime finite field . We can translate Theorems 4, 6, 13, Proposition 9 and Definition 10 to an arbitrary finite field in the same way as [27, Section 5.1].
Gilbert-Varshamov-type existential condition
Let be some prime power. In this section, we give a sufficient condition for existence of
, with given parameters.
Theorem 15 If positive integers , , , , satisfy
Proof The following argument is similar to the proof of Gilbert-Varshamov bound for stabilizer codes [5] and also to [27] . Let Sp( , ) be the set of invertible matrices on 2 that does not change the values of the symplectic inner product. Let ( ) be the set of pairs of linear spaces ( , ) such that dim = − − , For each ( , ) ∈ ( ), the number of such that
which implies
Similarly we have
If there exists ( , ) ∈ ( ) such that ( , ) ∉ ( , 1 ) and ( , ) ∉ ( , 2 ) for all 1 ≤ swt( 1 ) ≤ − 1 and 1 ≤ swt( 2 ) ≤ − 1 then there exists a pair of ( , ) with the desired properties. The number of such that 1 ≤ swt( ) ≤ − 1 is given by
By combining Eqs. (6), (7) and (8) we see that Eq. (5) is a sufficient condition for ensuring the existence of ( , ) required in Theorem 15.
⊓ ⊔
We will derive an asymptotic form of Theorem 15. In order to justify our study of strong security, we will show an insecure ramp scheme constructed in the framework of [26, 27] . Let 1 , . . . , 4 and max be as defined in Example 3, and = = 3, = 4, = 4, = 0. Let S = { } and R = max . For classical secret = ( 1 , . . . , 4 ), the encoder applies the unitary matrix corresponding to
One can verify that the participant set = {1, 2, 3} is neither qualified nor forbidden. According to Proposition 9, the Holevo information between and the shares of is 2 log 2 3 bits. Since 1 has nonzero components in only, so can measure the quantum observables corresponding to ( 1 ) and ( 1 ). We have
By [20, Lemma 5] , the intermediate set can know the values of 1 and 3 by the quantum measurement.
Definition and construction of strongly secure schemes
Definition 17 Let ⊂ {1, . . . , } be a share set and the density matrix of shares in . Let ∈ be a classical secret drawn from the uniform probability distribution on . Let ⊂ {1, . . . , ∕2}. A quantum ramp secret sharing scheme is said to be strongly secure if ( ; ) = log 2 > 0 then ( ∪ ∕2+ ( ); ) = 0 for all with 2| | ≤ − , where (⋅; ⋅) denotes the Holevo information [32, Section 12.1.1] counted in log 2 , ∕2 + = { ∕2 + ∶ ∈ } and ∪ ∕2+ is previously defined projection to an index set ∪ ∕2 + ⊂ {1, . . . , }.
The above definition is a straightforward generalization of [18, Definition 6 ] to the quantum setting, with regarding ( , + ∕2 ) ∈ 2 as one symbol and the secret consisting of ∕2 such symbols. Let = , , be nonnegative even integers with ≥ 2 + 2 . In this subsection, we will construct a scheme distributing a classical secret consisting of symbols in to participants with 1 qudit of dimension , so that any ( + + )∕2 participants can reconstruct the secret, while any ( + )∕2 or less participants have no information about the secret, with the above strong security. Let 1 , . . . , ∈ be distinct elements. We assume that 1 , . . . , ∕2 are nonzero. Define an [ , ] Reed-Solomon (RS) code as
Then we can easily see that McEliece and Sarwate [31] proposed the first strongly secure ramp secret sharing scheme, whose strong security was proved much later [33] . Let 1 , . . . , + be distinct elements in . For a given secret ( 1 , . . . , ) ∈ , choose a polynomial ( ) of degree less than ( + + )∕2 such that ( ) = for = 1, . . . , . Then it distributes ( + ) to the -th participant. Any ( + + )∕2 or more participants can reconstruct the secret. Any ( − + )∕2 or less participants have no information about the secret. Thus the qualified sets are the same, but the McEliece-Sarwate scheme has smaller forbidden sets than the proposed one in Section 6.2. In addition, the McEliece-Sarwate scheme can support at most − participants, while the proposed one in Section 6.2 can support at most .
